

Message Text

PAGE 01 STATE 288194
ORIGIN SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 /026 R

DRAFTED BY AF/E:GWSCOTT:CJ

APPROVED BY AF:RMMOOSE

AF/E:RPOST

S/S-O: SESTEINER

-----037895 022305Z /63

P 022057Z DEC 77

FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO AMEMBASSY MOGADISCIO PRIORITY

INFO AMEMBASSY NAIROBI PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY SANA

AMEMBASSY CAIRO

AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM

AMEMBASSY JIDDA

AMEMBASSY ROME

AMEMBASSY LONDON

AMEMBASSY PARIS

AMEMBASSY BONN

AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

AMEMBASSY TEHRAN

USMISSION USUN NEW YORK

S E C R E T STATE 288194

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: SO, US

SUBJECT: CALL BY SOMALI AMBASSADOR ON AF ASSISTANT
SECRETARY

REF: STATE 285110

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 STATE 288194

I. ASSISTANT SECRETARY MOOSE MET WITH SOMALI AMBASSADOR
ADDU NOVEMBER 29 AT ADDU'S REQUEST. ADDU BEGAN BY
NOTING THAT THIS WAS HIS FIRST VISIT TO THE DEPARTMENT
SINCE THE GOVERNMENT OF THE SOMALI DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC
(GSDR) HAD ANNOUNCED ON NOV. 13 THE EXPULSION OF THE
SOVIET MILITARY AND CIVILIAN ADVISORS AND THE DENIAL TO
THEM OF THE USE OF SOMALI MILITARY FACILITIES.
HE FELT CHAMPAGNE WOULD BE IN ORDER.

2. SOVIET THREAT TO SOMALIA: ADDU INSISTED THAT THE

USSR REMAINED A THREAT TO THE INTERNAL STABILITY OF THE GSDR. THE SOVIETS WERE ORCHESTRATING A PUNITIVE PLAN INVOLVING CUBANS, SOUTH YEMENIS AND THE EASTERN BLOC IN WHICH ETHIOPIA WOULD ASSAULT NORTHERN SOMALIA, THREATENING HARGEISA AND BERBERA. THE USSR WOULD THEN ATTEMPT TO IMPOSE A PEACE. PRESIDENT SIAD WOULD NOT AGREE, BUT HE WOULD BE REPLACED THROUGH THE EFFORTS OF THE SMALL GROUP OF SOMALIS IN THE PARTY CENTRAL COMMITTEE WHO HAD OPPOSED THE DECISION OF NOV. 13. SUCH AN EVENTUALITY WOULD

THREATEN THE ENTIRE REGION AND AFFECT THE INTERESTS OF THE UNITED STATES AND THE WEST. THE GSDR WAS NOT THREATENED BY ETHIOPIA; THE LOCAL WAR COULD BE HANDLED BY LOCAL FORCES. THE PROBLEM WAS THE SOVIETS AND THEIR ALLIES. THEY NOW CONTROLLED MENGISTU AND WERE IN CHARGE OF ETHIOPIA; WESTERN ARMS AND ASSISTANCE WERE NEEDED TO COUNTER THEIR WEIGHT. THE SOVIETS SHOWED NO INTEREST IN LESSENING THEIR INVOLVEMENT IN ETHIOPIA AND THEIR CONNECTION WITH THE MURDEROUS EPMG. ADDOU HAD BEEN INFORMED THAT WHEN NIGERIAN FOREIGN MINISTER GARBA HAD SEEN GROMYKO, AND SUGGESTED THAT THE SOVIETS WITHDRAW FROM THE HORN CONFLICT SO AS TO FACILITATE AN AFRICAN SOLUTION, GROMYKO HAD SIMPLY CHANGED THE SUBJECT. WITHOUT SOVIET SUPPORT FOR ETHIOPIA, THERE WOULD HAVE BEEN A

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 03 STATE 288194

ROUGH BALANCE OF FORCES AND THUS A CHANCE FOR NEGOTIATIONS.

3. PROSPECTS FOR NEGOTIATION: MR. MOOSE REPLIED THAT AT PRESENT THE SOMALIS, WHO WERE GENERALLY PERCEIVED TO BE THE AGGRESSORS, WERE IN A STRONG POSITION AND SHOULD SUPPORT THE OAU MEDIATION EFFORT. INSTEAD, THE EFFECT OF THE CONTINUING SOMALI OFFENSIVE WAS TO DRAW SOVIET SUPPLIES INTO ETHIOPIA. ADDOU CONFIRMED THAT THE SOMALIS DID NOT MEAN TO HALT THEIR ADVANCE UNTIL DIRE DAWA WAS TAKEN, BUT INSISTED THAT THEY WERE READY TO NEGOTIATE AT ANY TIME ON THE BASIS OF SELF-DETERMINATION FOR THE LOCAL PEOPLE. BUT THE GSDR COULD NOT DISREGARD THE DEEP FEELINGS OF THE OGADENI SOMALIS. HE HAD NOT WISHED TO INTRODUCE A PERSONAL NOTE, BUT THE US SHOULD UNDERSTAND THAT THE ENMITY OF THE ETHIOPIAN/SOMALI RELATIONSHIP DID NOT SPRING SIMPLY FROM THE FACT OF ALIEN RULE; IT WAS A QUESTION OF SEVERE ETHIOPIAN BRUTALITY: IN HIS FAMILY, FOR INSTANCE, TWO MATERNAL UNCLES HAD BEEN EMASCULATED AS CHILDREN BY ETHIOPIAN TROOPS.

4. ADDOU PROPOSES PRIOR APPROVAL OF AN ARMS LIST FOR SOMALIA: ADDOU THEN ASKED THAT WE AT LEAST CONSIDER PREPLANNING OF AN ARMS SUPPLY EFFORT SO THAT WE WOULD BE READY WHEN THE TIME CAME. A LIST

OF APPROPRIATE DEFENSIVE MILITARY EQUIPMENT COULD BE DRAWN UP AND AGREED TO IN ADVANCE, EITHER THROUGH A SPECIAL SECRET US SURVEY MISSION OR BY A US DEFENSE ATTACHE IN MOGADISCIO. THE GSDR WOULD PLEDGE NOT TO USE ANY WESTERN ARMS AGAINST THEIR NEIGHBORS. US READINESS TO MOVE FORWARD AS SOON AS CONDITIONS ALLOWED US TO IMPLEMENT OUR DECISION IN PRINCIPLE WOULD STRENGTHEN SIAD'S HAND AGAINST ANY ATTEMPT TO REPLACE HIM WITH A SOVIET TOOL. MR. MOOSE REPLIED THAT THE US POSITION WAS THAT WE COULD NOT DISCUSS ARMS SUPPLIES UNTIL THE SITUATION IN THE OGADEN HAD BEEN RESOLVED.

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 04 STATE 288194

5. NON-AGGRESSION TREATY WITH KENYA: MR. MOOSE NOTED THAT WE HAD ENCOURAGED THE GOK TO ADOPT A MORE FAVORABLE ATTITUDE TOWARDS SOMALIA, BUT WE BELIEVED THE KENYANS HAD SOME CAUSE FOR CONCERN. PROTESTATIONS OF THE DESIRE FOR GOOD RELATIONS WERE NOT CONVINCING WHEN ACCOMPANIED BY WARNINGS FROM SOMALIA ABOUT THE TREATMENT KENYA SHOULD GIVE KENYAN CITIZENS, WHETHER THEY BE ETHNIC SOMALIS OR ANY OTHER GROUP. FURTHER, RECRUITMENT OF KENYAN SOMALIS INTO THE OGADEN WAR EFFORT AND THE USE OF KENYAN TERRITORY ARE NOT CONDUCTIVE TO GOOD RELATIONS. ADDOU INSISTED THAT THE GSDR WAS READY TO SIGN A NON-AGGRESSION TREATY WITH KENYA EMBODYING A STATEMENT THAT SOMALIA HAD NO TERRITORIAL DESIGNS ON THAT COUNTRY. MR. MOOSE FELT THAT AN INITIATIVE OF THIS SORT MIGHT WELL GO FAR TO STILLING KENYAN FEARS AND HE ENCOURAGED THE GSDR TO PURSUE THIS THOUGHT.

6. REQUEST FOR ADVICE: ADDOU THEN ASKED WHAT THE US WOULD HAVE SOMALIA DO. MR. MOOSE SAID THAT THE GSDR SHOULD PUT ITSELF IN A DEFENSIBLE MILITARY AND DIPLOMATIC SITUATION. ADDOU REPLIED THAT THE GSDR WAS IN A "PANIC SITUATION". IF SIAD INVITED REPRESENTATIVES OF THE GOK TO MOGADISCIO TO SIGN A NON-AGGRESSION PACT, WOULD THAT PLEASE THE US? MR. MOOSE SAID THAT IT WOULD BE A STEP FORWARD, BUT THE GSDR SHOULD NOT CONCLUDE THAT WE WERE ONLY CONCERNED ABOUT KENYA AND NOT ABOUT THE OGADEN.

7. KASSIM VISIT: ADDOU THEN ASKED IF THE US WERE PREPARED TO RECEIVE A SPECIAL ENVOY, MINISTER OF MINERALS KASSIM, WHOM SIAD WISHED TO SEND TO MEET THE PRESIDENT AND THE SECRETARY. HE WAS TOLD THAT WE WOULD BE HAPPY TO RECEIVE KASSIM, BUT WE DOUBTED THAT A MEETING WITH THE

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 05 STATE 288194

PRESIDENT COULD BE ARRANGED (SEE REFTEL).

8. CONCLUDING REMARKS: FINALLY, ADDOU RETURNED TO THE QUESTION OF PRIOR AGREEMENT ON A MILITARY SUPPLY LIST, AND ASKED THAT WE CONSIDER HIS REQUEST AND REPLY TO IT LATER. MR. MOOSE REPLIED THAT WHILE WE WOULD CONSIDER THE PROPOSITION, HE COULD NOT LEAVE ADDOU WITH THE IMPRESSION THAT IT WAS LIKELY WE WOULD CHANGE OUR DECISION NOT TO ENTER INTO AN ARMS DISCUSSION WHILE SOMALI TROOPS REMAIN IN THE OGADEN. MR. MOOSE CONCLUDED BY SAYING THAT THE US POSITION HAD REMAINED CONSISTENT. DESPITE OUR EARLY AND CLEAR STATEMENT OF POSITION THE GSDR HAS CONTINUED IN ITS PATH. THE RESULT HAS BEEN A WORSENING OF THE SITUATION. THE SOVIETS HAVE USED THE

INTERVENING PERIOD TO POUR IN ARMS; THE EQUIPMENT THE SOMALIS ARE NOW USING IN THE OGADEN IS THE EQUIPMENT WHICH THE GSDR MIGHT USE TO DEFEND ITSELF.

9. AFTER THE MEETING WITH MOOSE, ADDOU PURSUED WITH DEPTOFF THE SUBJECT OF PRE-POSITIONING A STOCK OF DEFENSIVE ARMS TO BE PROVIDED FOR DEFENSE OF SOMALIA'S LEGITIMATE TERRITORY SHOULD SOMALI REGULAR UNITS BE FORCED OUT OF OGADEN. DEPTOFF SERIOUSLY DOUBTED THAT US WOULD BE PREPARED TO SUPPLY ARMS OR TO DRAW UP PLANS FOR FUTURE SUPPLIES WHILE SOMALI UNITS INSIDE ETHIOPIAN TERRITORY. TO DO EITHER WOULD BE INTERPRETED AS ENTERING INTO A MILITARY RELATIONSHIP WITH A GOVERNMENT PERCEIVED AS THE AGGRESSOR IN AN ARMED CONFLICT. ADDOU SUGGESTED SUCH A PLAN COULD BE DRAWN UP SECRETLY. DEPTOFF QUESTIONED WHETHER AN UNDERTAKING OF THAT NATURE COULD BE KEPT SECRET IN WASHINGTON IN 1977. ADDOU NODDED. VANCE

SECRET

<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: Z
Capture Date: 22-Sep-1999 12:00:00 am
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: DIPLOMATIC DISCUSSIONS, AMBASSADORS
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Sent Date: 02-Dec-1977 12:00:00 am
Decaption Date: 22 May 2009
Decaption Note: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 22 May 2009
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1977STATE288194
Document Source: ADS
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: AF/E:GWSCOTT:CJ
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: 11652 GDS
Errors: n/a
Expiration:
Film Number: D770448-0498
Format: TEL
From: STATE
Handling Restrictions:
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1977/newtext/t197712111/baaaaeunt.tel
Line Count: 197
Litigation Code IDs:
Litigation Codes:
Litigation History:
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE, TEXT ON MICROFILM
Message ID: 70f35dfc-c188-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
Office: ORIGIN SS
Original Classification: SECRET
Original Handling Restrictions: EXDIS ONLY
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 4
Previous Channel Indicators:
Previous Classification: SECRET
Previous Handling Restrictions: EXDIS ONLY
Reference: n/a
Retention: 0
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 08-Feb-2005 12:00:00 am
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review Media Identifier:
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
SAS ID: 119043
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: CALL BY SOMALI AMBASSADOR ON AF ASSISTANT
TAGS: PDIP, MASS, SO, US, (ADDOU)
To: MOGADISCIO INFO NAIROBI MULTIPLE
Type: TE
vdkgvwkey: odbc://SAS/SAS.dbo.SAS_Docs/70f35dfc-c188-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
Review Markings:
Margaret P. Grafeld
Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
22 May 2009
Markings: Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 22 May 2009